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When Can You Trust “Trust?” 
Calculative Trust, Relational Trust, and Supplier Performance 
    
 
 ABSTRACT  
 
Little research has empirically assessed two distinct bases for trust: a calculative forward-looking 
assessment of whether it pays to cooperate versus relational trust, a judgment anchored in past 
behavior and characterized by a shared identity. Our findings from buyer–supplier relationships 
demonstrate that calculative trust and relational trust positively influence supplier performance, 
with calculative trust having a stronger association than relational trust. Yet, important boundary 
conditions exist. If buyers invest in supplier-specific assets or when supply side market 
uncertainty is high, relational trust, not calculative trust, is more strongly associated with supplier 
performance. In contrast, when behavioral uncertainty is high, calculative trust, not relational 
trust, relates more strongly to supplier performance.  These findings suggest that exchange 
partners should seek to match their use of trust with transactional attributes. 
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As a focal governance supporting interfirm exchanges, trust has distinct forms (Rousseau, 
Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer, 1998). With calculative trust, managers believe the costs and benefits 
of complying with the business agreement will outweigh those associated with self-interested, 
opportunistic actions (Parkhe, 1993; Srinivasan and Brush, 2006; Williamson, 1993). In contrast, 
relational trust arises from social relationships when there are strong beliefs about the goodwill, 
honesty, and good-faith efforts of others, which mitigate risk by aligning core values (Bromiley 
and Harris, 2006; Ring, 1996; Zaheer and Harris, 2005). However, whereas calculative trust and 
relational trust co-exist and characterize most business relationships (Lewicki, Tomlinson, and 
Gillespie, 2006; Rousseau et al., 1998), empirical work treats trust as an aggregate construct 
(Handley and Angst, 2014; Zaheer and Harris, 2005; but see Saparito, Chen and Sapienza, 2004).   
This aggregation is problematic because controversial views exist. One camp argues that 
when there are opportunities for individual gain, breaches in confidences and expectations occur; 
because rewards and punishments incentivize transactions and deter opportunistic behavior, 
calculative trust offers a superior means to ensure cooperation (Williamson, 1996; Parkhe, 1993).  
In contrast, the other camp proposes that relational trust is more effective because partners 
behave in accordance with prior expectations and beliefs (e.g., Das and Teng, 2001; Faems, 
Janssens, and Van Looy, 2008; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). Moreover, an emerging empirical 
literature suggests the effectiveness of trust depends on the transactional attributes, yet they do 
not examine alternative forms of trust (e.g., Goerzen, 2007; Krishnan, Martin, and 
Noorderhaven, 2006; Poppo, Zhou, and Zenger, 2008b; Zhou et al., 2014).  Accordingly, two 
important questions remain unanswered: (1) how do calculative and relational trust affect 
exchange performance? And (2) how do transactional attributes moderate the relationships 
between calculative/relational trust and exchange performance? 
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To address these questions, we focus on the roles of calculative and relational trust in 
buyer-supplier exchanges, particularly on how trust affects supplier performance, i.e., the 
buyer’s evaluation of the supplier’s task performance (e.g. Cannon and Perreault, 1999; 
Mesquita and Brush, 2008; Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone, 1998).  We further examine three 
well-reasoned transactional attributes which may lead the supplier to renege on its performance 
agreement: (1) asset specificity (i.e., the buyer makes sunk investments in supplier-specific 
assets); (2) supply market uncertainty (i.e., unpredictable changes in the supply market); and (3) 
behavioral uncertainty (i.e., unobservability and incomplete information regarding the supplier’s 
processes and activities) (e.g. Schepker et al., 2014).   
Our key reasoning focuses on the different decision rules and logic associated with 
calculative and relational trust.  Calculative trust relies on a forward-looking decision rule: a 
continual reassessment of relative payoffs for whether it pays to cooperate (Saparito et al., 2004).  
This decision rule requires deliberate processing and accuracy. In contrast, relational trust is 
anchored in the past, arising from repeated interaction. As a decision rule, it functions as a 
heuristic, a shortcut that avoids conscious deliberation (Uzzi, 1997). Our findings show that if 
buyers invest in supplier-specific assets or when supply side market uncertainty is high, the 
heuristic processing associated with relational trust, not calculative trust, is more strongly 
associated with supplier performance. Yet, when behavioral uncertainty is high, calculative trust, 
not relational trust, relates more strongly to supplier performance.  
Our study contributes to extant trust literature in several ways. First, it is among the few 
efforts that empirically distinguish between calculative and relational trust, the two prominent 
types that feature most exchanges. Second, our study develops a contingent view of trust by 
showing how the effectiveness of calculative and relational trust is differentially affected by 
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transactional attributes. Third, our study also enrich the supply chain management research by 
illustrating how buyers could use alternative forms of trust to match with transactional features 
so as to achieve better supplier performance.  
Theoretical Framework 
Trust refers to “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability 
based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau et al., 1998: 
395). In inter-organizational relationships, trust denotes an exchange partner’s expectation that 
the other party can be relied on, will behave as predicted, and will act fairly (Zaheer et al., 1998). 
It fosters perceptions of stability, enhances bilateral coordination, and limits performance losses 
that would otherwise occur because of self-interest and opportunism. Empirical studies validate 
this focus: trust and its related normative conventions are associated with lower transaction costs, 
greater knowledge transfer, and better exchange performance (e.g., Artz and Brush 2000; Gulati 
and Nickerson, 2008; Li, Poppo, and Zhou, 2010; Poppo and Zenger 2002; Zaheer et al., 1998).  
Calculative versus Relational Trust  
Trust, however, has different bases.  Drawing from Transaction cost economics (TCE), 
implicit contracting, and game theory (Axelrod, 1984; Williamson, 1996), scholars propose that 
a structure that aligns incentives with rewards can lead to stable, predictable outcomes. This 
approach can be applied to trust, “a term with many meanings … [to] define and delimit the 
elusive notion of trust (Williamson, 1993: 453).  Calculative trust informs expectations by 
deliberately and rationally assessing forward-looking conditions: It requires calculations of 
benefits and costs, and hinges on the relative values of cheating (e.g., net costs of termination) 
and cooperation (Bromiley and Harris, 2006; Lewicki et al., 2006).  When it is high, parties 
believe that cooperation and performance goals will be achieved because falling short of them 
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leads to penalties, including exchange termination (Parkhe, 1993). Thus, sanctions, the expected 
payoffs of rewards over the penalties, decrease opportunistic behavior, regulate exchanges, and 
preserve cooperation.   
 Others argue that a social foundation of trust best describes long-standing, stable business 
relationships (Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 1995; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). Ongoing 
interaction lets parties accumulate experiences, form expectations of each other, and develop 
shared values and normative conventions that define how parties will work together (Bercovitz, 
Jap, and Nickerson, 2006; Macneil, 1980). Relational trust arises when social relations evolve to 
a state in which each partner can expect to act according to the other’s preferences and priorities 
(Lewicki et al., 2006; Saparito et al., 2004). With high relational trust, partners develop a mutual 
understanding and shared identity in which they “‘think like’ the other, ‘feel like’ the other, and 
‘respond like’ the other” (Lewicki et al., 1996: 122–123). Such mutuality helps partners make 
decisions for each other, reduces the risk of opportunistic behavior, increases timely adaptation, 
and improves joint outcomes.  
Whereas ongoing exchanges feature both calculative and relational trust in varying 
degrees (Rousseau et al., 1998), these types of trust are distinct constructs with different logics 
and decision rules.  The central logic underlying calculative trust is incentives, a rational 
assessment of well-structured rewards and punishments. Accordingly, calculative trust relies on a 
forward-looking decision rule: a continual reassessment of relative payoffs for whether it pays to 
cooperate (Saparito et al., 2004).  This decision rule requires deliberate processing and accuracy. 
In contrast, relational trust is anchored in the past, arising from repeated interaction.  A shared 
identity is the strongest form of social attachment that may develop as parties consider each 
other’s interests as if they were their own.  As a decision rule, relational trust functions as a 
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heuristic, a shortcut to rational assessment, based on the overall quality of the relationship rather 
than each single transaction (Rousseau et al., 1998; Uzzi, 1997). It enables the “navigation of 
increasingly complex interpersonal environments by simplifying the information processing 
task” (Lewicki and Brinsfield, 2011: 117). 
Transactional Attributes and Risk 
Three transactional attributes increase the risk that parties will defect from business 
agreements to achieve gains: asset specificity, market uncertainty, and behavioral uncertainty 
(Williamson, 1996). Asset specificity refers to customized investments specific to the exchange 
made by one party that cannot be deployed for alternative uses. In this study, we focus on buyer 
asset specificity, which means the buyer has invested in supplier-specific assets and risks sizable 
sunk costs if the exchange is terminated. Since these assets cannot be redeployed to other 
transactions, the supplier may hold up the buyer (Williamson, 1996). For example, the supplier 
may renege on the initial terms to extract a greater share of the buyer’s quasi-rent. It may also 
not prioritize optimal delivery of products and ship late, not procure the required quality inputs, 
or submit invoices that misrepresent its operational costs (Wathne and Heide, 2000).  
Market uncertainty refers to unpredictable changes in external environments. In this 
study, we focus on supply market uncertainty, which refers to unpredictability in supply prices, 
vendor support, and the supplier’s manufacturing technologies and product design (Canon and 
Perreault, 1999). Because uncertainty creates instability that is difficult for managers to 
understand and respond to, it challenges exchanges by requiring adaptation (Carson, Madhok, 
and Wu, 2006).  Behavioral uncertainty refers to the extent to which one party cannot effectively 
observe or evaluate the activities of the other party (Zhou and Poppo, 2010). When behavioral 
uncertainty arises, the other party is more likely to misbehave or not disclose information in 
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order to maximize self-gain (Schepker et al., 2014). In our study, when the buyer cannot readily 
observe and verify supplier activities, the supplier can hide actions such as undersupplying effort 
or ignoring critical processes or requirements (Canon and Perreault, 1999).  
In next section, we will examine how calculative/relational trust influences exchange 
performance and how these transactional attributes moderate the effects of trust on performance.  
Figure 1 summarizes our conceptual model. 
 Insert Figure 1 about here.  
 
Hypotheses 
Direct Effects of Trust  
Calculative trust “permits economic actors to deal with each other, but in guarded ways” 
(Ring, 1996: 152) because exchange partners try hard to meet performance goals only when 
noncompliance delivers a penalty, the most severe of which is exchange termination (e.g., 
Parkhe, 1993; Telser, 1980). When partners believe rewards and punishment are well specified 
for the particular transaction, the benefits derived from executing the specified task outweigh the 
net costs from not doing so (Williamson, 1993).  This motivates each party to fulfill its 
performance obligations. As a forward-looking logic, calculation implies that buyers and 
suppliers will assess the rewards and punishment for each new transaction, proceeding only 
when the transaction projects net gains (Williamson, 1993; Poppo, Zhou, and Ryu, 2008a). As 
Parkhe (1993) indicates, parties choose to cooperate when they expect payoffs from a series of 
exchanges; the longer their expectation of time horizon, the greater the perceived benefits from 
cooperation. Thus, the forward-looking rational assessment of calculative trust incentivizes 
parties to achieve desired performance.  
Hypothesis 1a: Calculative trust is positively associated with supplier performance. 
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By showing “good faith in the intent and reliability of partner behavior” (Krishnan et al., 
2006: 896), relational trust should also foster supplier performance. When relational trust exists, 
the buyer and its supplier hold common beliefs and commitment to the partnership.  These 
beliefs harmonize interests, curtail potential opportunistic behavior, and motivate exchange 
parties to comply with and commit to joint goals (Ouchi, 1980; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994).  As 
a heuristic, relational trust also facilitates decision-making. Because relational trust provides 
partners with the perceptions of stability to their relationships, they do not need to continually 
monitor the other, collect information, fully examine the current situation, and reassess the 
relationship (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Lewicki and Brinsfield, 2011). The supplier thus has the 
autonomy to make decisions on behalf of both parties which fulfill its performance expectations. 
Therefore, we predict that   
Hypothesis 1b: Relational trust is positively associated with supplier performance. 
 
 Moderating Effects of Transactional Attributes 
  Asset Specificity.  While the relationship between trust and exchange performance is well 
documented, under-examined is how asset specificity moderates this relationship when trust is 
partitioned into its calculative and relational components.  We suggest that asset specificity 
negatively moderates the effect of calculative trust but positively moderates the impact of 
relational trust on performance.  When a buyer has not invested in supplier-specific assets, the 
buyer can easily switch to an alternative supplier should its performance be low.  As a result, if 
the perceived rewards over punishment are high, suppliers are motivated to achieve explicit 
performance targets because any misconduct is tied to negative economic consequences while 
meeting performance goals are rewarded, including renewed business (Parkhe, 1993; 
Williamson, 1993).   
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However, when buyer asset specificity is high, it creates a situation of asymmetric 
dependence – the buyer cannot exit the relationship without considerable out-of-pocket costs. 
Such sunk costs reduce the effectiveness of calculative trust.  Even though rewards and 
punishments exist, incentives are misaligned: because only the buyer is bound by sunk costs, the 
supplier knows it can haggle over costs and extract a quasi-rent from the buyer without much 
punishment.  Thus, whereas both parties perceive a well-structured system of rewards and 
punishments, the supplier may focus on generating returns from the buyer’s specialized 
investment. Because supplier’s self-interest of return generation dominates, such misalignment 
erodes improvements in supplier performance. Therefore, we predict that when assets are 
specific, calculative trust is less effective at incentivizing supplier performance.   
Hypothesis 2a: The positive relationship between calculative trust and supplier performance is 
weaker when buyer asset specificity is high than when it is low. 
 
 When relational trust exists, exchange parties share a common identity and favor a decision 
to do the right thing for the relationship (Lewicki and Brinsfield, 2011). This shared identity 
alters the meaning and expected behavior arising from a specialized investment: both partners 
are committed to work together to fully utilize the specialized investment, rather than to take 
advantage of it. Accordingly, relational trust makes a buyer’s investment in supplier-specific 
assets a credible signal of commitment, not an asymmetry to be exploited (Gambetta, 2009).  
Furthermore, with relational trust, parties use the ‘we’ heuristic to make decisions in accordance 
with collective goals (Uzzi, 1997).  For example, as Srinivasan and Brush (2006) show, when the 
buyer credibly commits to the relationship and the supplier reciprocates this goodwill, supplier 
performance increases. In contrast, when asset specificity is low, the requirement for transaction-
specific adaptions is low and the exchange process is largely standardized (Cannon and 
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Perreault, 1999).  Accordingly, relational trust is less needed to coordinate routine exchanges. 
Thus, we predict that  
Hypothesis 2b: The positive relationship between relational trust and supplier performance is 
stronger when buyer asset specificity is high than when it is low. 
 
Market Uncertainty.  Prior work presents mixed views on whether market uncertainty 
strengthens or weakens the effect of trust on performance. Rousseau et al. (1998) indicate that 
because trusting parties can work jointly to deal with uncertainty, trust is most valuable when 
uncertainty exists; if there is no uncertainty, there is no need for trust to coordinate exchanges 
(see also Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Zajac and Olsen, 1993). In contrast, others argue that 
uncertainty increases the information processing demands required to navigate the future. 
Because trusting parties are less likely to search adequately for information outside of the 
relationship, trust is less suitable to effective adaptation to environmental changes (Krishnan et 
al., 2006; Lewicki and Brinsfield, 2011).  We advance a more nuanced proposition that market 
uncertainty weakens the effect of calculative trust but bolsters the impact of relational trust. 
The efficacy of calculative trust hinges on incentive alignment. Under low levels of 
market uncertainty, well-structured rewards and penalties effectively align incentives: parties 
will find cooperation more valuable than defection because they can obtain stable information to 
accurately assess the trade-offs.  However, if the supplier’s operating environment is highly 
uncertain, important factors such as pricing, product specifications and technologies are 
changing constantly (Krishnan et al., 2006). In such conditions, the reward structure is less likely 
to accurately map how uncertainties affect exchange behavior and outcomes, making parties less 
assured whether cooperation is still favored.  As a result, when market uncertainty is high, 
calculative trust is less effective in enabling continuous adaptation and motivating performance.  
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Hypothesis 3a: The positive relationship between calculative trust and supplier performance is 
weaker when supply market uncertainty is high than when it is low.  
 
In contrast, we argue that relational trust may be more beneficial when supply markets 
are uncertain.  With relational trust, exchange parties expect to continue to work together and 
adapt jointly to external changes. This commitment is based on previous interactions which give 
rise to positive expectations of a shared future (Lewicki and Brinsfield, 2011).  By providing a 
bilateral orientation to adaptation, relational trust ensures continuous cooperation despite 
uncertainty (Lado, Dant, and Tekleab, 2008). Moreover, as a decision heuristic, relational trust 
favors a “we” orientation toward quick and continuous coordination, a critical practice for 
adapting successfully to uncertain environments (Li, Poppo, and Zhou, 2010; Luo, 2003). As a 
result, relational trust enables parties to “act as if the future were more certain” (Zajac and Olsen, 
1993: 140; Rousseau et al., 1998). In contrast, relational trust is less needed for supply markets 
with lower uncertainty, because continuous and efficient adaptation is less necessary.   
Hypothesis 3b: The positive relationship between relational trust and supplier performance is 
stronger when supply market uncertainty is high than when it is low. 
 
Behavioral Uncertainty.  We predict that calculative trust can better motivate 
performance when behavioral uncertainty exists.  For calculative trust, unobserved behavior is 
disciplined through expected payoffs in which rewards depend on expected outcomes.  When 
behavioral uncertainty is high, what is hard to observe is the inputs or activities.  Yet, with 
calculative trust, parties can still rely on the final output to evaluate the other. For example, if the 
buyer detects low quality output, it can punish the supplier by terminating the business 
agreement, which causes net losses for misbehavior (Parkhe, 1993; Telser, 1980). In addition, 
forward-looking assessments remind parties to perform well in order to acquire additional 
business in the future, even though their behavior is difficult to assess (Poppo et al., 2008a). 
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Thus, by aligning rewards and punishments with outcomes, calculative trust reduces the risk of 
misconduct and motivates better performance.  
Hypothesis 4a: The positive relationship between calculative trust and supplier performance is 
stronger when behavioral uncertainty is high than when it is low. 
 
We also predict that relational trust should be more valuable when behavioral uncertainty 
is high.  Ouchi (1980) argues that a “clan” culture is most beneficial for tasks defined by 
behavioral ambiguity -- the harmony of shared interests and goals aligns joint action, and results 
in effective task performance.  Thus, both parties will align their goals and act to achieve the 
mutual performance objectives despite the inability to observe the other.  Relational trust also 
enables heuristic problem-solving such that the whole relationship rather than each individual 
transaction is emphasized.  This joint orientation is more valuable when behavioral uncertainty 
exists because it generates positive beliefs and interpretation of each other’s actions (Krishnan et 
al., 2006).  For example, when the buyer holds the supplier in good faith even though accurate 
information about the supplier’s processes and procedures are lacking, the supplier is willing to 
share the information of its activities, which helps reduce the behavioral uncertainty. Thus, 
relational trust is more effective at high levels of behavioral uncertainty.   
Hypothesis 4b: The positive relationship between relational trust and supplier performance is 
stronger when behavioral uncertainty is high than when it is low. 
 
Methodology 
Sampling and Data Collection 
TCE focuses on the “make-or-buy” decision (Williamson, 1996) and supply chain 
management emphasizes how buyers manage their suppliers to enhance exchange performance 
(Cousins et al., 2006; Zhou et al., 2014). Consistent with this tradition, we examined buyer–
supplier relationships of manufacturing firms, and collected the data from firms located in two 
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major areas of China, Beijing and Shanghai. In China, social relationships (e.g., guanxi) underlie 
and coordinate business to business transactions, and as the country transitions to a more market-
driven economy, contracts are increasingly used to safeguard investment risks (Zhou and Poppo, 
2010). As a result, relational and calculative trust are both common in China, making this context 
suitable to test our conceptual framework.   
We first developed an English version of the questionnaire that independent translators 
then back-translated into Chinese to ensure conceptual equivalence. To ensure the content and 
face validity of the measures, we conducted five in-depth interviews with senior purchasing 
managers and asked each respondent to verify that our measures were relevant and complete.  
From their responses, we revised a few questionnaire items to enhance their clarity. Then, we 
conducted a pilot study with 24 purchasing professionals who not only answered all the items but 
also provided feedback on the design and wording of the questionnaire. We finalized the 
questionnaire based on the results of the pilot study.   
For the final survey, we randomly selected a sample of 600 firms from a list of Chinese 
manufacturing companies located in the four-digit Chinese Standard Industrial Classification 
codes 1311–4290. These firms spanned diverse industries (e.g., materials, plastics, electronics, 
apparel, food). For each firm, a senior purchasing manager was the key informant because our 
interviews revealed that these managers know most about relationships with suppliers.   
We recruited and trained interviewers to conduct the survey onsite; the interviewers 
visited the managers in their offices, presented the survey, clarified any questions, and collected 
the survey after completion. This process is a useful way to obtain quality data in emerging 
economies. The interviewers first contacted managers by telephone to solicit their cooperation. 
To motivate their participation, the managers were informed of the academic nature of the study 
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and the confidentiality of their responses, and were offered an incentive in the form of a 
summary report. 286 managers from different firms agreed to participate, 213 of whom were 
interviewed onsite. Informants selected one of their firms’ major suppliers located in China and 
answered the survey questions about exchanges with that supplier. After eliminating two surveys 
with missing data, we obtained 211 complete responses, for an effective response rate of 35.2%.   
Most of the firms (60.2%) had 100–1000 employees; 52.1% had more than US$3 million 
in annual sales revenue; 16.6% were state-owned; 59.2% were private; and 24.2% were public 
firms. On average, respondents had worked for 11.3 years in the industry and 6.9 years with their 
company. A comparison between the responding and nonresponding firms using multivariate 
analysis of variance indicated no significant differences in terms of key firm characteristics (i.e., 
industry type, firm ownership, number of employees, and annual sales revenues) (Wilks’  = 
.83; F = 1.26; p = .49), which suggested that nonresponse bias was not a concern.   
To validate our key informant approach, we used Podsakoff and Organ’s (1986) post hoc 
technique to select 24 firms randomly from participating firms and conducted onsite interviews 
one year later with two purchasing managers or directors from each firm. Of the two managers, 
one was the previous participant and the other was a new informant. We obtained responses from 
38 managers from 19 firms. The interrater reliability between the two managers’ responses 
ranged from .88 (calculative trust) to .83 (supplier performance) (all p < .001). The test–retest 
reliability of the same managers’ responses in these two interviews ranged from .87 (supplier 
performance) to .72 (asset specificity) (all p < .001), demonstrating the consistency of the 
responses (cf. Li et al., 2008). We also collected additional data from both the buyers and their 
suppliers and obtained a matched dataset of 28 buyer-supplier dyads. The results indicated high 
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consistency of buyer and supplier’s perceptions of focal constructs (e.g., r = .82 for relational 
trust). These results indicated that our key informant approach was valid. 
Measures  
The Appendix lists the questionnaire items. We developed the measures of calculative 
and relational trust based on the conceptual works of Lewicki and Bunker (1996) and Rousseau 
et al. (1998).  The measure of calculative trust consists of three items. Two items assess the 
strength of rewards and punishments that sanction cooperative behavior in the 
interorganizational exchange (see Lewicki and Bunker, 1996: 119-120), and one item captures 
the degree of exchange continuity. According to the repeated game logic, the expectation of 
doing business in the long run allows exchange parties to reward or punish prior moves 
(Axelrod, 1984). For relational trust, its highest level is shared identity (Lewicki and Bunker, 
1996; see also, Maguire, Phillips, and Hardy, 2001).  Our measure has three items: shared 
identification, shared understanding, and thinking like one another, each of which reflects the 
degree to which a shared identity exists and enables one party to trust the other to act on its 
behalf (see Lewicki and Bunker, 1996: 122-3). Our items are highly consistent with Saparito et 
al.’s (2004) measures of self-interest assumption and relational trust in the service (banking) 
sector. 
Our measure of buyer asset specificity (Buyer AS) comes from Cannon and Perreault 
(1999) and captures buyers’ specific investments in product features, personnel, inventory and 
distribution, and capital equipment and tools to accommodate suppliers’ needs. We adapted a 
measure of market uncertainty from Cannon and Perreault (1999) to examine the environmental 
changes in the supply market with respect to pricing, product features and specifications, vendor 
support services, technology, and product supply. On the basis of Brown, Dev, and Lee (2000), 
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we developed a measure of behavioral uncertainty that assesses how difficult it is to evaluate the 
other party’s activities.   
We adapted the measure of supplier performance from Cannon and Perreault (1999) and 
Zaheer et al. (1998). It examines supplier performance in the focal exchange relationship with 
respect to product quality, timeliness of delivery, after-sales support, and total value received.  
Controls.  We controlled for several sources of heterogeneity. First, we considered prior 
experience because the accumulation of experiences is necessary to support trust (Lewicki and 
Bunker, 1996). We measured it with the logarithm of the years that the firm had done business 
with its supplier. We also controlled for two formal governance mechanisms, explicit contracts 
and monitoring, with measures adapted from Lusch and Brown (1996) and Dahlstrom and 
Nygaard (1999), respectively.  
Second, we controlled for the effects of buyer ownership and buyer size. Because prior 
work suggested that state-owned, private, and public listed firms may behave differently (Peng, 
2003), we used two dummy variables: private and state-owned, with public listed firms as the 
baseline. We used the logarithm of the employee number to indicate buyer size.   
Third, we controlled for supplier asset specificity (Supplier AS) and supplier importance. 
Supplier AS was adapted from Cannon and Perreault (1999). Supplier importance was indicated 
by the percentage of the manufacturer’s total annual demand for the component obtained from 
the supplier.  
Fourth, we used two dummy variables to control for differences in the primary industry 
in which the buyer operated: mechanics and heavy (e.g., chemicals, materials, automobile), with 
others (e.g., consumer products such as apparel, furniture, and food) as the baseline. Given the 
prevalent use of personal social ties (i.e., guanxi) to coordinate exchanges in China, we adapted 
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the measure from Child, Chung, and Davies (2003) to control for guanxi importance in the 
market. 
Construct Validity. We followed Anderson and Gerbing (1988) in refining the multiple-
item measures and assessing their construct validity. We ran exploratory factor analyses for each 
multiple-item variable, which resulted in factor solutions as theoretically expected. Reliability 
analyses also showed that these measures possess satisfactory coefficient reliability. Then, we 
ran confirmatory factor analysis for a ten-factor model. The Appendix reports the results of this 
analysis, including the goodness-of-fit index, factor loadings, and composite reliability.   
Because the chi-square test is sensitive to sample size, we relied on the comparative fit 
index (CFI), incremental fit index (IFI), and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) 
to evaluate the model fit (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). As the Appendix shows, all the fit 
indexes were above the .90 benchmark (CFI = .90, IFI = .90, and RMSEA = .07); therefore, the 
model fits the data satisfactorily. Further, the composite reliabilities of all the constructs ranged 
from .72 to .92, above the .70 benchmark. The average variance extracted for every construct 
was higher than the .50 cutoff (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). Thus, these measures demonstrate 
satisfactory convergent validity.   
We assessed the discriminant validity of the measures in two ways. First, we ran pairwise 
chi-square difference tests for all multiple-item scales to determine whether the restricted model 
(correlation fixed at 1.0) fit the data significantly worse than the freely estimated model did 
(correlation estimated freely). All the chi-square differences were highly significant (e.g., 
supplier performance vs. calculative trust: 2(1) = 220.24, p < .001), in support of discriminant 
validity (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). We also performed Fornell and Larcker’s (1981) more 
stringent test and found that the average variance extracted for each construct was greater than its 
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highest shared variance with other constructs (see the Appendix), further supporting discriminant 
validity. Overall, these results showed that our measures possessed satisfactory reliability and 
validity. Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations for the constructs.  
 Insert Table 1 about here.  
  
Common Method Assessment. Because information about the dependent and independent 
variables came from the same respondent, we recognized the potential for common method bias 
and assessed it in two ways. First, we ran a Harman one-factor test (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986), 
which loads all the perceptual items into an exploratory factor analysis. Factor 1 accounted for 
only 26.32% of the variance, indicating that common method bias was unlikely to be a major 
concern in our data. Second, we used the “MV” marker test, which uses a scale theoretically 
unrelated to at least one construct in the model as the MV marker to proxy for common method 
variance (Lindell and Whitney, 2001). We used a four-item scale to measure a manufacturer’s 
physical resources (Cronbach’s α = .90) and adjusted the construct correlations and statistical 
significance by the lowest positive correlation (r = .011) between the MV marker and other 
variables. None of the significant correlations was insignificant after this adjustment (see Table 
1). Therefore, common method bias is unlikely to be a serious concern.   
Analyses and Results 
In our model, calculative trust (CT) and relational trust (RT) are likely to be endogenous. 
Transactional attributes may increase the likelihood that parties lie, cheat, misrepresent 
information, thereby threatening effective cooperation (Williamson, 1996). In response, 
managers select appropriate governance mechanisms to safeguard transactions. Thus, proper 
model specification should include transactional attributes as the antecedents of calculative and 
relational trust: buyer asset specificity (BAS), supplier AS (SAS), market uncertainty (MU), and 
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behavioral uncertainty (BU). Similarly, prior experience (PE) is necessary to support trust 
(Gulati, 1995). Guanxi (GI) is also important for trust development (Li et al., 2008). To correct 
for this potential endogeneity, we used a three-stage least square analysis (Hamilton and 
Nickerson, 2003).   
In Stage 1, as specified in Equation 1, we regressed two types of trust against BAS, SAS, 
MU, BU, PE, and GI to obtain predicted values of relational trust and calculative trust. The 
results (see Table 2) indicate that calculative trust is significantly related to market uncertainty (b 
= -.23, p < .01), behavioral uncertainty (b = .20, p < .01), prior experience (b = .30, p < .01), and 
guanxi importance (b = .24, p < .01); relational trust is significantly related to buyer asset 
specificity (b = .12, p < .05), supplier asset specificity (b = .23, p < .01), market uncertainty (b = 
.24, p < .01), behavioral uncertainty (b = –.34, p < .01), prior experience (b = .25, p < .01), and 
guanxi importance (b = .19, p < .01). These results support the use of the three-stage model to 
correct for the potential endogeneity of calculative trust and relational trust. We then obtained 
residuals that are free of influence from asset specificity, market uncertainty, behavioral 
uncertainty, prior experience, and guanxi importance.  
CT = b0 + b1 (BAS) + b2 (SAS) + b3 (MU) + b4 (BU) + b5 (PE) + b6 (GI) + e,       
            to obtain     CTresidual = CT– CTpredicted. 
RT = b0 + b1 (BAS) + b2 (SAS) + b3 (MU) + b4 (BU) + b5 (PE) + b6 (GI) + e,       
            to obtain     RTresidual  = RT  – RTpredicted.    (1) 
 
 Insert Table 2 about here.  
 
In Stage 2, we used CTresidual and RTresidual as the indicators of CT and RT, respectively. That 
is, we regressed performance against CTresidual and RTresidual and the controls (see M2 in Table 3). 
Supplier performance = b0 + b1 (CTresidual) + b2 (RTresidual) + bcontrols (Controls) + e    (2) 
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In Stage 3, we added interaction terms to test the moderating effects. To assess the effect of 
each moderator, we added interactions stepwise as in M3, M4, and M5 and then tested the full 
model in Equation 3 (M6 in Table 3). Because product terms can incur collinearity, we mean-
centered the variables before we constructed the interaction terms (Aiken and West, 1991). We 
checked for multicollinearity by assessing the variance inflation factors associated with each of 
the predictors in our models. The highest value of these factors is 2.03, well below the 10.0 
benchmark, thus indicating multicollinearity was not an issue. Table 3 reports the regression 
results of the controls-only model (i.e., M1), as well as the second- and third-stage models.  
Performance = b0 + b1 (CTresidual) + b2 (RTresidual) + bcontrols Controls 
          + c1 (CTresidual  BAS) + c2 (RTresidual  BAS) + c3 (CTresidual  MU)  
          + c4 (RTresidual  MU) + c5 (CTresidual  BU) + c6 (RTresidual  BU) + e.     (3) 
 
 Insert Table 3 about here.  
 
As Table 3, Model 2 shows, both calculative (b =.35, p < .01) and relational (b =.12, p < 
.05) trust related positively to supplier performance, in support of H1a and H1b. Calculative trust 
is more strongly associated with performance than relational trust is.  
We used the full model (M6 in Table 3) to test the interaction hypotheses. Hypothesis 2 
assesses the moderating role of buyer asset specificity. The interaction effect of calculative trust 
 buyer asset specificity is negative (b = –.15, p < .01), and that of relational trust  buyer asset 
specificity is positive (b =.12, p < .05). These findings support H2a and H2b.   
Hypothesis 3 examines the moderating effect of market uncertainty. The interaction 
effect of calculative trust  market uncertainty is negative (b = -.13, p < .05), and that of 
relational trust  market uncertainty is positive (b = .14, p < .05), in support of H3a and H3b. 
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Hypothesis 4 examines the moderating effect of behavioral uncertainty. The interaction 
effect of calculative trust  behavioral uncertainty is positive (b = .14, p < .05), and that of 
relational trust  behavioral uncertainty is insignificant (b = .04, p > .10). These findings support 
H4a, but not H4b. 
To gain more insight into the interaction effects, we followed Aiken and West’s (1991) 
procedure and conducted simple slope tests for significant interactive terms. For Hypothesis 2, 
we split the buyer asset specificity variable into two groups—low (one standard deviation below 
the mean) and high (one standard deviation above the mean)—and estimated the effect of 
calculative/relational trust on performance for both levels. We find that calculative trust is 
strongly related to performance when buyer asset specificity is low (simple slope b = .66, p < 
.01), but not when it is high (b = .11, p > .10). Relational trust is not significantly related to 
supplier performance (b = –.03, p > .10) when buyer asset specificity is low, but is positively 
related to performance when it is high (b = .27, p < .01). These results suggest that calculative 
trust works better when buyer asset specificity is low, whereas relational trust is more effective 
when it is high.  
For Hypothesis 3, calculative trust is strongly related to performance when market 
uncertainty is low (b = .53, p < .01). This effect is weaker when it is high (b = .22, p < .05). The 
effect of relational trust is positive when market uncertainty is high (b = .23, p < .01), but is 
insignificant when market uncertainty is low (b = –.01, p > .10). These findings indicate that 
calculative trust is more effective when market uncertainty is low, whereas relational trust works 
better when it is high. 
For Hypothesis 4, calculative trust relates more strongly to performance when behavioral 
uncertainty is high (b = .56, p < .01) than when it is low (b = .14, p < .10). Because the 
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interaction between relational trust and behavioral uncertainty is insignificant, we did not 
conducted the simple slope test. 
 
Other effects. As Table 3 shows, prior experience and explicit contracts are positively 
related to supplier performance, which implies that both prior social relationships and explicit 
contracts foster better supplier performance. In contrast, monitoring is negatively related to 
supplier performance, indicating that it may reduce the autonomy of partners and lower their 
motivation to perform well. Supplier importance is also positively associated with performance, 
which suggests that more orders from the same supplier help improve its task performance.   
Neither buyer nor supplier AS improves performance. The governance mechanism (e.g., 
relational trust) appears to influence the value-creation potential of AS. Market uncertainty 
positively affects supplier performance, but behavioral uncertainty negatively affects it. Market 
uncertainty appears to offer suppliers an opportunity to work hard and adapt to changes in ways 
that improve their performance; because our sample represents the major suppliers for each 
buyer, suppliers may see successful adaptation as a way to promote recognition and thus their 
reputation. Alternatively, when the buyer cannot observe the supplier’s activities, suppliers seem 
to have less motivation to contribute because they cannot be evaluated and rewarded clearly.      
Discussion  
Research Implications 
Interfirm business transactions rarely depend on only one source of trust (Das and Teng, 
2001; Lewicki and Bunker, 1996; Rousseau et al., 1998), yet research seldom examines different 
bases of trust. Our study is among the few that distinguishes between calculative trust and 
relational trust. Consistent with logic for how the metering of rewards and punishments induces 
cooperation (Williamson, 1993), we show that calculative trust is positively associated with 
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supplier performance. Our results also confirm that relational trust relates positively to supplier 
performance: through the mechanisms of commitment and heuristic processing, relational trust 
enables the supplier to make decisions on behalf of the relationship that improve performance. 
Interestingly, calculative trust appears to have a stronger effect than relational trust (its 
standardized estimate is almost two times larger than that for relational trust, see Table 3), 
showing the value of developing strong rewards and sanctions. This finding contrasts with 
Saparito et al. (2004), who found that relational trust, but not self-interest (i.e., calculative logic), 
reduced the likelihood of the customer switching in the banking industry. Possibly, relational 
trust is more relevant in service sectors, which involve intensive interpersonal interactions, 
whereas for buyer-supplier exchanges in manufacturing sectors, calculative trust is more 
effective at disciplining and directing the supplier’s operational decisions.  
More importantly, our study helps develop a contingent view of trust by showing how the 
roles of calculative versus relational trust are differentially moderated by three transactional 
attributes (cf. Krishnan et al., 2006; Poppo et al., 2008b). We find that calculative trust has a 
weaker relationship with supplier performance when the buyer has invested a great deal in 
supplier-specific assets or the supply market is highly uncertain; yet it is more effective in times 
of behavioral uncertainty. We reason that because the buyer cannot easily reverse its sunk 
investment, calculative incentives, including punishment and repeat business, are less effectual: 
the supplier can hedge on performance without sanctions. Also, market uncertainty challenges 
the accuracy of a strong calculus because information is incomplete and changing; as a result, 
calculative trust relates less strongly to supplier performance. However, for unobservable 
supplier activities, well-structured incentives discipline supplier performance. This assessment 
based on outcomes highlights the repercussions of shoddy performance. Our interviews with a 
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global supply manager at Logitech highlight this calculative logic: Logitech’s managers told 
their Chinese suppliers that if they found a copy of Logitech’s newest product model on the 
street, they would curtail the business relationship forever. 
In contrast, we find that relational trust has a stronger effect on performance in the 
presence of specialized assets or market uncertainty. Relational trust appears to alter the meaning 
of specialization from self-interest to commitment, and alter subsequent actions from reneging to 
realizing transactional value. When market uncertainty is high, the commitment and shared 
identity of relational trust increase the buyer’s willingness to support flexible and continuous 
adaptation of the exchange to the supplier’s changing environment, leading to better supplier 
performance. Surprisingly, we fail to find the support for our hypothesis that relational trust 
relates more positively to supplier performance when behavioral uncertainty is high. According 
to Ouchi (1980), because shared identity aligns goals and because heuristic processing generates 
positive beliefs about each other’s actions, relational trust should be most effective when 
behavioral uncertainty arises (see also Rousseau et al., 1998). However, Granovetter (1985) 
cautions about the limits of relational trust and the inherent risk of embedded relationships: those 
who are closest to us are in the best position to deceive us.  In balance, the potential positive and 
negative effects cancel out each other, resulting in a nonsignificant net effect.  
Overall, our contingency findings challenge the assumption that trust helps reduce the 
risk arising from transactional attributes (e.g., Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Rousseau et al., 
1998). They also extend previous conflicting empirical studies (e.g., Poppo et al., 2008a; Zajac 
and Olsen, 1993 vs. Goerzen, 2007; Krishnan et al., 2006) by showing the need to match 
transactional attributes with the types of trust. In addition, by taking the buyer’s perspective, our 
results suggest instances in which the buyer may need to rely more or less on its trusting 
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perceptions given the transactional risk. This approach shows the value of not assuming a 
symmetric view of dyadic trusting beliefs (DeJong and Dirks, 2012; Graebener, 2009; Zaheer 
and Zaheer, 2006). 
Managerial Implications 
For practitioners, our findings suggest a contingent use of trust. First, relational trust, but 
not calculative trust, is more valuable when the buyer has invested significant supplier-specific 
assets. Managers who rely solely on calculative trust to align incentives are likely to experience 
less-than-satisfactory performance when buyer asset specificity is high. Rather, they should 
make specialized investments only when a shared identity exists. Because forming a shared 
identity likely takes considerable social interaction, managers need to be sensitive to time 
demands; not every supplier might warrant a relational bond. Second, managers should match 
their use of trust with different types of uncertainty. When the supply market is highly uncertain, 
the buyer needs to develop relational trust, but not rely on calculative trust, to foster supplier 
performance. With relational trust, exchange partners will work together and take joint actions to 
deal with the market uncertainty in a timely manner. When the buyer cannot easily observe the 
behavior of the supplier, they need calculative trust, but not relational trust, to gauge the final 
output of the supplier by highlighting how output will be rewarded or punished.      
Limitations and Further Research 
Our findings have several limitations. First, our cross-sectional design limits our ability to 
infer cause-effect relationships and to examine the processes for developing each form of trust. 
Prior work suggests that in newly formed exchanges, calculation should be the primary source 
for confident expectations (Rousseau et al., 1998). Over time, the distinct individual orientation 
of calculative trust may be supported, but not supplanted, by a more collective orientation such 
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that both parties share a common identity (Lewicki et al., 2006; Saparito et al., 2004). A 
longitudinal study is needed to understand the evolution and dynamic roles of calculative and 
relational trust.  
Second, our use of key informants may lead to common method bias. We addressed this 
issue with additional data collection and post hoc analysis; our focus on interaction effects 
further reduces this concern because respondents are unlikely to have a mental “interaction-based 
theory” that creates systematic bias in their responses (Aiken and West, 1991). Still, our key 
informant reflects a buyer perspective, which may be different from a supplier perspective, 
leading to asymmetric trust perceptions (Zaheer and Zaheer, 2006). We encourage researchers to 
collect data from dyadic and different sources to overcome this concern.   
Third, while the early work focused on whether contracts and trust were substitutes or 
complements (Gulati, 1995; Poppo and Zenger, 2002), recent advances examine how and when 
trust may simultaneously substitute for and complement different forms of formal governance 
(Gulati and Nickerson, 2008; Zhou and Xu, 2012). Future research could examine whether 
calculative and relational trust play differential roles in complementing or substituting for formal 
governance.  
Fourth, our sample of buyer-supplier exchanges exhibits relatively less interaction and 
interdependence than do many other types of inter-organizational exchanges (Faems et al., 
2008), including those that involve power asymmetry (Graebner, 2009) and explorative and 
exploitative outcomes (Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos, 2011). Future work should replicate our 
study in other contexts such as strategic alliances or joint ventures.   
Conclusion 
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Despite the prominent role of trust in interfirm exchanges, prior studies have rarely 
empirically considered alternative bases for trust. Our study distinguishes between calculative 
trust and relational trust, and further develop a contingent view:  calculative trust is more 
effective for behavioral sources of risk (e.g., unobservability), whereas relational trust works 
better for sunk costs (i.e., asset specificity) and exogenous risk (e.g., supply side uncertainty). 
Therefore, managers must carefully match their use of alternative forms of trust with different 
types of transactional attributes.   
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Figure 1  The Conceptual Model 
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Table 1  Basic Descriptive Statistics of the Constructs 
      
Construct 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. Supplier performance   0.44 0.27 -0.10 0.02 -0.37 0.30 0.37 -0.35 0.11 -0.06 0.13 -0.02 0.27 -0.17 0.06 -0.04 
2. Calculative trust 0.45   0.33 -0.05 0.15 -0.19 0.30 0.32 -0.41 0.05 -0.04 0.04 0.03 0.17 -0.17 0.07 0.16 
3. Relational trust 0.28 0.34   0.26 0.28 -0.27 0.31 0.15 -0.09 -0.10 0.09 0.15 0.34 0.41 -0.10 -0.04 0.07 
4. Buyer AS -0.09 -0.04 0.27   0.35 0.15 -0.04 -0.09 0.32 -0.15 0.04 0.02 0.39 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.04 
5. Supply market 
uncertainty 0.03 0.16 0.29 0.36   0.21 -0.08 0.09 0.25 -0.07 -0.05 0.07 0.36 -0.05 -0.09 -0.05 0.10 
6. Behavioral uncertainty -0.36 -0.18 -0.26 0.16 0.22   -0.31 -0.08 0.45 -0.04 -0.04 -0.16 0.15 -0.27 0.12 -0.06 0.28 
7. Prior experience 0.31 0.31 0.32 -0.03 -0.07 -0.30   0.08 -0.36 -0.13 0.18 0.23 0.09 0.37 -0.05 0.00 -0.14 
8. Contracts 0.38 0.33 0.16 -0.08 0.10 -0.07 0.09   -0.18 -0.07 -0.12 0.08 -0.03 0.00 -0.12 0.09 -0.06 
9. Monitoring -0.34 -0.40 -0.08 0.33 0.26 0.46 -0.35 -0.17   -0.16 0.02 -0.10 0.26 -0.04 0.08 -0.12 0.09 
10. Private firm 0.12 0.06 -0.09 -0.14 -0.06 -0.03 -0.12 -0.06 -0.15   -0.55 -0.34 -0.13 -0.02 -0.11 0.10 0.05 
11. State-owned firm -0.05 -0.03 0.10 0.05 -0.04 -0.03 0.19 -0.11 0.03 -0.54   0.26 0.04 0.13 0.12 -0.10 -0.07 
12. Buyer size 0.14 0.05 0.16 0.03 0.08 -0.15 0.24 0.09 -0.09 -0.33 0.27   0.01 0.08 -0.01 -0.04 -0.16 
13. Supplier AS -0.01 0.04 0.35 0.45 0.37 0.16 0.10 -0.02 0.27 -0.12 0.05 0.02   0.10 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 
14. Supplier importance 0.28 0.18 0.42 0.01 -0.04 -0.26 0.38 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.14 0.09 0.11   -0.16 0.06 -0.01 
15. Mechanics -0.16 -0.16 -0.09 0.03 -0.08 0.13 -0.04 -0.11 0.09 -0.10 0.13 0.00 -0.04 -0.15   -0.35 0.11 
16. Heavy 0.07 0.08 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.05 0.01 0.10 -0.11 0.11 -0.09 -0.03 -0.03 0.07 -0.34   -0.07 
17. Guanxi importance -0.03 0.17 0.08 -0.03 0.11 0.29 -0.13 -0.05 0.10 0.06 -0.06 -0.15 -0.02 0.00 0.12 -0.06   
18. MV marker  
     (physical) 0.12 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.15 -0.03 0.13 -0.18 0.08 0.15 0.16 0.07 0.10 -0.09 -0.07 
Mean 4.90 5.35 4.47 3.24 3.93 3.92 1.42 4.92 3.16 0.59 0.17 5.15 3.75 46.14 0.27 0.23 5.12 
SD 1.06 1.07 1.37 1.36 1.06 1.37 0.60 1.23 1.35 0.49 0.37 1.02 1.29 29.03 0.45 0.42 1.18 
Min 1.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 3.91 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.33 
Max 7.00 7.00 7.00 6.50 6.40 7.00 3.69 7.00 6.33 1.00 1.00 8.99 6.50 100 1.00 1.00 7.00 
Notes:   1.    N = 211; p < .05 (two-tailed) for | r | > 0.13. 
2. Below the diagonal is the zero-order correlation; above the diagonal is the correlation adjusted for potential common method variance with the MV 
marker technique.  
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Table 2  Standardized Estimates of Stage 1 Regression Analyses 
 Calculative Trust Relational Trust 
Independent Variables b b 
Buyer asset specificity                    -0.08                       0.12* 
Supplier asset specificity                     0.01 0.23** 
Supply market uncertainty  -0.23** 0.24** 
Behavioral uncertainty 0.20** -0.34** 
Prior experience 0.30** 0.25** 
Guanxi importance 0.24** 0.19** 
   
Adjusted R2  0.19 0.34 
Highest VIF 1.71 1.71 
Model F  9.08 23.37 
DF 6,204 6,204 
   
** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (two-tailed). 
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Table 3 Standardized Estimates of Regression Analyses  
Independent Variables                                    Supplier Performance  
Control Variables M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
Prior experience  0.10†  0.13*  0.13*  0.13*  0.11†  0.11† 
Contracts  0.31**  0.20**  0.22**  0.20**  0.18**  0.20** 
Monitoring  -0.35** -0.16* -0.15* -0.17* -0.16* -0.17* 
Private firm  0.13†  0.12†  0.10  0.11†  0.11†  0.09 
State-owned firm  0.00  0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 
Buyer size  0.09  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.09  0.09 
Supplier AS  0.07  0.04  0.04  0.02  0.04  0.02 
Supplier Importance  0.22**  0.14*  0.13*  0.14*  0.13*  0.12* 
Mechanic -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01  0.01  0.01 
Heavy -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 
Guanxi importance  0.04  0.06  0.07  0.07  0.06  0.07 
Direct Effects       
 Buyer asset specificity (AS)  -0.03  0.00 -0.02 -0.04  0.00 
 Supply market uncertainty (MU)   0.11†  0.12*  0.15*  0.10†  0.14* 
 Behavioral uncertainty (BU)  -0.23** -0.25** -0.22** -0.23** -0.24** 
 Calculative trust (CT)  H1a:  0.35**  0.34**  0.34**  0.34**  0.31** 
 Relational trust (RT) H1b:  0.12*  0.13*  0.13*  0.14*  0.11† 
Interactions       
CT  × Buyer AS  H2a:  -0.16**   -0.15** 
RT  × Buyer AS H2b:   0.11*    0.12* 
CT  × Supply market uncertainty  H3a:   -0.14*  -0.13* 
RT  × Supply market uncertainty H3b:    0.12*   0.14* 
CT  × Behavioral uncertainty  H4a:     0.13*  0.14* 
RT  × Behavioral uncertainty H4b:     0.02  0.04 
       
Adjusted R2  0.35 0.48 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.53 
R2  Change   0.13** 0.03** 0.02* 0.02* 0.05** 
Highest VIF 1.61 1.92 1.94 1.94 2.00 2.03 
Model F  11.52 13.45 13.93 13.20 12.70 12.34 
DF 11,199 16,194 18,192 18,192 18,192 22,188 
       
** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (two-tailed). 
 
The Appendix: Measurement Items and Validity Assessment (Main Model) 
Calculative trust: CR = .82, AVE = .61, HSV = .29  
Factor 
Loading 
1. Considering rewards and punishments, both parties behave honestly in dealing with each other. 
2. The behavior of both parties is trustworthy because the costs and punishments of misconduct are very high. 
3. We expect the relationship with this supplier to continue for a long time. 
.84 
.79 
.70 
Relational trust: CR = .89, AVE = .73, HSV = .27   
1. Both parties would let the other make decisions because we both think like one another. 
2. Both parties can effectively act for the other because both share the same understanding of what matters. 
3. Both parties are confident that their interests will be fully protected, because both share a common identity. 
.80 
.87 
.89 
Supplier performance: CR = .92, AVE = .74, HSV = .29  
Please rate this supplier’s performance on the following aspect (1 = needs great improvement, 7 = excellent) 
1. Product quality. 
2. Timeliness of delivery. 
3. Sales, service, and/or technical support. 
4. Total value received 
 
.86 
.84 
.88 
.85 
Buyer asset specificity: Please indicate the extent to which your firm has made investments or changes specifically to 
accommodate this supplier (1 = none, 7 = a great deal):  CR = .90, AVE = .70, HSV = .24 
 
1. product’s features. 
2. personnel. 
3. inventory and distribution. 
4. capital equipment and tools. 
.77 
.87 
.86 
.83 
Supply market uncertainty: CR = .85, AVE = .54, HSV = .19  
For this supply market, the following factors are changing (1 = very infrequently, 7 = very frequently) 
1. Pricing       
2. Product feature and specifications   
3. Vendor support services    
4. Technology used by suppliers   
5. Product supply 
 
.46 
.78 
.84 
.87 
.66 
Behavioral uncertainty: CR = .72, AVE = .57, HSV = .32  
1. It is difficult to evaluate if this supplier follows our recommended operating procedures. 
2. We don’t have accurate reports about this supplier’s activities. 
.86 
.84 
Supplier asset specificity: Please indicate the extent to which the supplier has made investments or changes 
specifically to accommodate your request (1 = none, 7 = a great deal):  CR = .88, AVE = .64, HSV = .24 
 
1. product’s features. 
2. personnel. 
3. inventory and distribution. 
4. capital equipment and tools. 
.71 
.87 
.79 
.83 
Monitoring: CR = .92, AVE = .80, HSV = .32  
1. We spend a lot of time to control quality and quantities of deliveries from this supplier. 
2. We watch this supplier closely to make sure on-time delivery occurs. 
3. We monitor the operational procedures of this supplier. 
.90 
.93 
.86 
Explicit contracts: CR = .91, AVE = .71, HSV = .16  
In dealing with this supplier, to what degree do you rely on the written contracts (as opposed the shared 
understanding) to specify (1 = very low; 7 = very high): 
1. the role of each party 
2. the responsibility of each party 
3. how each party is to perform 
4. what will happen in the case of events occurring unplanned 
 
 
.78 
.92 
.92 
.73 
Guanxi importance: CR = .86, AVE = .66, HSV = .10  
1. In this market, business depends on good connections with friends and family. 
2. In this market, Guanxi is still very important. 
3. In this market, Guanxi is a requirement for success. 
.84 
.75 
.85 
Model Fit: 2(515) = 1105, p < .01; CFI = .90, IFI = .90; RMSEA = .07  
Notes: CR = composite reliability; AVE = average variance extracted; HSV = highest shared variance with other 
constructs. If unspecified, the scales are anchored as 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree. 
